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REPORT OF THE REFLECTION GROUP CONFERENCE WIPO,
Geneva , Switzerland Ambassador Anthony K.G. Hill Rapporteur: Tatiana Carayannis, United Nations Intellectual History Project Contents 2. Acknowledgements...............3 3. Summaries of reflections, in speaking order Anthony Hill, Conference Chairman...............3 Yves Berthelot...............5 Victor Santiapillai...............6 Paul Berthoud...............7 Dharam Ghai...............8 Havelock Brewster...............9 Jean Freymond...............11 Gamani Corea...............12 Reinaldo Figueredo...............14 Louis Emmerij...............15 Branislav Gosovic...............16 Enrique Ter Horst...............17 4. Themes of general discussion............... 18 5. Next steps............... 22 Appendix A - List of Participants...............23 B - Executive Summary............... 24 The brainchild of Ambassador Anthony Hill, the Reflection Group Conference convened a small group of individuals, each with a long association with the United Nations family, to reflect on their many years of international public service. Taking advantage of the extensive intellectual resources available in and around Geneva , participants were drawn primarily, although not exclusively from that area. In explaining his choice of venue in his third written communication to participants, Ambassador Hill noted that " Geneva is one of the most under-rated and under-utilized of the in-gathering places of ideas and personalities that have helped shape the second half of the century." A list of participants may be found in Appendix A. The meetings were held over two days, 1-2 April 2000 at the conference facilities of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva . This free-ranging exchange was designed with a three-fold purpose in mind: first, to give recognition to the intellectual resources of the United Nations, and to highlight their uses and misuses. Second, to encourage the free flow of ideas with the aim to frame questions which might lead to tentative conclusions about "lessons learned" in multilateral efforts. Third, to contribute, through reflection and personal anecdotes, to the United Nations Intellectual History Project and its on-going efforts to produce a forward-looking intellectual history of the UN's economic and social contributions since 1945. The format was intentionally open-ended, with no agenda, no formal presentations and no output in mind other than a synthesis report of the proceedings, and the discussions were digitally recorded. The goal of this minimalist structure was to allow participants themselves the opportunity to shape the discussions by giving them the flexibility to raise issues that they considered salient rather than conform to a predetermined thematic outline. Thus, they could define the terms of their own contribution. In order to stimulate thinking and to help frame the discussions, Ambassador Hill posed a series of questions to participants in the weeks leading up to the conference, and opened the discussion with four additional questions. The questions the participants were asked to consider ahead of time included the following: · Did we have a sufficiently deep understanding of the issues at the time of negotiations? · Why was one position taken instead of another? Were these positions constrained by the "group" dynamics? · Did our views influence the outcomes? · After all these years, how should those outcomes be evaluated, both as to original intention as well as relevance to the central overarching objective? · Was our "best" good enough in the circumstances of the times? · What remains to be done? · Should we give up on our past efforts? · What lessons may we draw? This was also to ensure that reflections would be critically oriented, forward-looking and analytical, minimizing, to the extent possible, the temptation to revise history. At the start of the proceedings, Ambassador Hill invited each participant to take ten minutes to make an initial contribution on a topic of their choice; to "reflect" and to "speak from the heart," after which the general discussion was opened. 2. Acknowledgments Ambassador Hill opened the meeting by explaining that although this was a self-financed exercise, several individuals and organizations were invaluable in making it happen. Kamil Idris, Director-General of WIPO for the last two years made available the state-of-the-art conference facilities of his organization as the venue for the conference. In addition, WIPO provided lunch and coffee breaks on both days of the conference, as well as a technician, Henri-Charles Goossens, to operate the recording equipment. Lesley Sherwood, also of WIPO, availed herself before and during the conference to ensure its success. The Centre for Applied Studies and International Negotiation (CASIN) in Geneva, headed by Jean and Guadalupe Freymond, offered their offices and staff for the planning of the conference. Sheila O'Byrne of CASIN worked with Ambassador Hill and Lesley Sherwood to coordinate arrangements. Louis Emmerij, Richard Jolly and Thomas G. Weiss, co-directors of the multinational United Nations Intellectual History Project (UNIHP) based at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, supported the effort through several means. Louis Emmerij attended the conference, and the Project recorded the proceedings using Digital Audio Tape recording (DAT) equipment, thus ensuring an audio record of the conference discussions of archival quality. In addition, UNIHP sent one of its researchers from New York , Tatiana Carayannis, to serve as the rapporteur for the conference. The South Centre, headed by Branislav Gosovic, sent out the first round of letters to invited participants, with personal follow-up by the Centre's Awni Behnam and Mary Chehab. Ambassador Hill noted that this support was backstopped by moral support from Gamani Corea. Ambassador Hill reported to participants that Dragoslav Avramovic would not be attending as planned as he had been hospitalized shortly after his arrival in Geneva . Everyone present joined Ambassador Hill in wishing Dr. Avramovic a speedy recovery. 3. Summaries of reflections Anthony Hill Ambassador Hill prefaced his remarks by reminding participants that this was to be an informal conversation "in congenial company," as well as a formal conversation, a colloquium of sorts, with the intention of learning from each other's experience and from the lessons offered by history. To provoke discussion, Ambassador Hill then posed four questions to which he offered some answers. I arrived in Geneva in 1968, just barely
thirty years old, and I turned up in the Latin American group.
It wasn’t called Latin American and the Caribbean Group, it was just
the Latin American Group. My Latin colleagues used to say: “The Caribbean
and Jamaica . What’s that? Are you really independent?
Do you have a queen?”
First, he asked "What is missing?" In his view, what is missing is a compelling narrative of the United Nations, using narrative to connote "meaning and organization of the work of the peoples of the UN; a narrative that defines the institutions in which our deepest beliefs for peace and security are embodied." He equated this narrative further with a policy framework, a model capable of empirical verification, and a paradigm, and argued that this approach of trying to understand what organizes and gives meaning to the collective work of the UN is a useful one, as it helps explain what is meant by the "international community." Hill suggested that we have not told the story of what constitutes the "necessary and sufficient constellation of beliefs, values, techniques particular to and shared by the members of respective communities," in this case the international community as embodied by the UN. Second, Hill asked "When does a paradigm gain legitimacy?" Suggesting that the paradigm is synonymous with the community out of which the paradigm is constructed, Hill proposed that a paradigm's legitimacy is thus tied to its community. He argued that the international community's paradigm has lost its legitimacy because it has failed to roll back poverty and "casually dispenses with the dreams and abilities of the unemployed in the mad rush to modernization, modernity and the fetish of technology." "Progress today means little more than
change. The dominant ethos is the homage to technology, almost
as the end in itself. Progress has lost its human value-laden
essence and is now almost entirely mechanistic."
Third, Hill asked "How did the international community marginalize itself?" His response: because of the language it employs. Its discourse and resolutions too often confuse the meanings of words and symbols. The consequence is that that discourse has become less lucid and has distorted reality. He suggested that the group, in its discussions, also reflect on the words and their meanings that have come out of the myriad UN meetings and reports. Finally, and following on his earlier questions
of "What?" "When?" and "How?" Yves Berthelot Mr. Berthelot began his remarks by saying that one of the contributions of the UN is that it has raised some important issues in the economic and social fields, although it has failed to establish itself as a leading thinker in those areas. This, Berthelot argued, is what has contributed to its marginalization. He pointed out that although UNCTAD's Trade and Development Report and the Annual Survey of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) are excellent pieces of research, they still did not propel the UN into a leading role in economic and social issues. The reason for this failure and consequent marginalization, he argued, is the lack of depth of analysis and of policy proposals in UN research efforts. Offering again the example of the ECE, he said that it was absolutely correct in its analysis in 1989 about the transition process of eastern Europe when it said that the time needed for consolidation had been underestimated, and argued for the need to build institutions before privatization and liberalization. Today, the UN continues to make the same arguments but does not go far enough into detail, not far enough into developing "courageous" policy proposals to support its analyses. A second contribution of the UN is its principles and the many ideas it originated that endure, a point, he noted, the United Nations Intellectual History Project has undertaken to document. Nevertheless, in his view, the UN has not had sufficient courage to denounce the frequent violations or non-application of the principles that have been established and agreed to by governments. An illustration of the failure of the UN to expose instances when principles have not been respected is the issue of "brain-drain." Berthelot recounted how he presided over negotiations on "brain-drain" during his tenure at UNCTAD, while at the same time United States immigration policy actively recruited talent and "brains" from outside the United States . A prime example, he argued, of a UN effort that was largely ignored and whose principles were not adhered to. We don't do enough to produce courageous
policy proposals, so I would advocate for the need for more research.
The third reason for the marginalization of the UN is that "we don't go out of very traditional forms of dialogue or negotiation despite the evolution of the world." Referring to the North-South debate, he argued that although many issues can and should be debated along North-South lines, many negotiations are spurred by automatic reactions based on this division. Berthelot argued that the North-South debate is tantamount to intellectual laziness as the positions are so well known that the debate can be written in advance. Victor Santiapillai Mr. Santiapillai opened his remarks by noting what he sees as a significant contribution of the UN, the alleviation of world poverty and improvements in standards of living. He credited UNDP's Human Development Report and its architect, Mahbub ul Haq, for pointing out the significant improvements that have been made in the quality of life of developing countries since the 1960s. This was significant, he argued, because improvements were not measured simply in terms of per capita income which has no particular meaning, but rather in terms of life expectancy, access to education, access to clean water, and so on. If we use those measures, Santiapillai argued, it becomes evident that there have been significant contributions made by such UN institutions like the World Health Organization and the ILO. You may also remember that soon after the
UNDP report on the human development index, the World Bank also got
in on the act, and the development report of the World Bank of 1990
has, in bold black and white letters, poverty on its cover.
And so, if you regard UNDP as more UN and the World Bank and the IMF
as less UN, there has been a very deep impact of the UN side on the
other side in relation to poverty issues. Today it is almost hilarious
that almost for survival, the World Bank, IMF and WTO all have huge
placards about poverty in their publications. It’s something
that I think the UN can take credit for. The failures of the UN have largely been in economic development policy and finance, and in international trade. First, the failures of its efforts in development policy and finance trace its origins to the immediate post-war years, at the very beginning of these institutions. Many development institutions, including Bretton Woods were created before independence by the developed countries and the former colonial powers. The result of this, explained Santiapillai, is that it fragmented trade and development issues "into different pigeon-holes." Since then, two developments helped to sustain this failure. First, the UN secretariats developed a kind of hegemony and became more concerned about perpetuating their own organizations in the face of competition from others. Second, national representatives to these institutions supported one or the other of these secretariats' positions without regard to the totality of the development problems. Santiapillai recounted the following anecdote about the failure of the UN Special Fund to illustrate the effects of institutional rivalries on UN development policy:
That sealed the exclusion of the United Nations from economic development and development finance issues. Later, as a result of the deterioration in the terms of trade of commodities, which this committee had foreseen, there was an urge to address this issue at the United Nations, which gave rise to UNCTAD. He argued that by the time UNCTAD was set up in 1964, the antagonism between the UN and Bretton Woods which prevails to this day had already defined those institutional relationships, making collaboration nearly impossible ever since. This, he concluded, has been the fundamental cause of the UN's difficulties in bringing about major change in development policy. Paul Berthoud Mr. Berthoud focused his comments largely on the contributions and failures of the G-77 and on his experience at UNCTAD. He began his remarks by reflecting on the early days and objectives of UNCTAD. Like all revolutions, of course, this one had a pamphlet. And this pamphlet was the General and Special Principles adopted at UNCTAD I. -- Paul Berthoud UNCTAD's objective, he noted, was fundamentally "a political struggle to change the rules of the game in the world economy. It was perceived at the time that only a compact common front of the developing countries could develop the political counter-power which was necessary in order to try to match the overwhelming political power of the countries of the North. And in that strategy, obviously solidarity in position-taking was of the essence." He noted that differences in national interests and national conditions were fully recognized, but were kept second to the necessity of acting together to develop political strength. According to Berthoud, UNCTAD's first major struggle was to determine whether UNCTAD had the right to negotiate like GATT, or be a deliberative body only. What helped this struggle in UNCTAD's favor was its inheritance of ECOSOC's negotiating functions. Berthoud saw this as the first victory of the developing country movement and the beginning of the confrontation between the North and the South. He suggested that the closest the movement ever came to achieving its objectives was the first oil shocks of 1973, and added that at least in the field of energy, this show of commodity power brought the North to the negotiating table for some time. Berthoud argued that although on the whole the revolution failed, it did make several contributions. First, the single voice of the group system achieved something states are striving for in multilateral institutions today: transparency. Negotiations during that time were transparent largely because everyone had an opportunity to participate. Second, the group system facilitated the process of consensus as it brought to it an element of discipline to the negotiations. Third, the movement served an educational function as many of the G-77 did not have the capacity to study particular issues on their own. The group system approach at least exposed them to some of the issues that they would not otherwise have been exposed to or been able to respond to had the movement followed the more traditional "green room" approach practiced in other institutions. Fourth, the group system served as a protective shield for developing country delegates against the pressures of the North for their votes. Finally, the G-77 gave some consistency to what until then had been inconsistent definitions of what constituted a "developing country." Berthoud concluded that even if the revolution should have been known to be a "non-starter" from the beginning, and even though it failed, the G-77 produced a body of ideas too important to wish that it had not been attempted. "In other words, we tried, we failed, but I'm not prepared to accept that we were wrong in trying." Dharam Ghai In his reflection, Mr. Ghai looked at the major changes that have taken place in development efforts in the last fifty years. He began with a note of optimism since many of the ideas he put forth or devoted his professional life to are now part of conventional wisdom: full employment, the importance of poverty eradication to development, basic needs, integrated approach to development, and the connection between gender and employment. He concluded that although there is much to be critical of with regard to the UN system, its significance for human history has yet to be fully appreciated. Historians in a hundred
or two hundred years time, when they write about our times, will see
the UN as the most remarkable development in the whole of human history.
Why? Because until that time, people always fought each other.
This still goes on, of course, but for the first time in history all
the countries of the world have come together to do what Mahatma Gandhi
called “constructive work.” Two hundred years from now, this will
appear as one of the daring achievements of humanity Ghai began his review of development efforts by noting that the concept of development has been steadily broadened and enriched over the last fifty years to include not just growth, but income distribution, employment, satisfaction of basic needs, human development, and more recently human rights, gender equality, and protection of the environment. He added that whereas many of these issues had previously been pursued separately, increasingly they are coming together in a more unified concept of development. Second, he pointed out that there has been a growing differentiation among developing countries, offering Asian "successes" as an example. This differentiation, he argued, has many implications for global negotiations and international economic policy which the international community has not yet faced up to. The third change Ghai listed was the decline of developing countries' political power and bargaining positions as compared with the 1960s and 1970s. Fourth, he noted a dwindling interest in issues of international development, unlike an earlier point in history when these were major issues on the global stage for developing and industrialized countries alike. Finally, Ghai described what he sees as a shift in the balance of power among international actors. He explained that the influence and power of traditional actors of the last fifty years, governments and international agencies, has steadily eroded, as new actors are playing a more important role. These new actors include markets, corporations, civil society and the media. Havelock Brewster Ambassador Brewster addressed first, the balance sheet of successes and failures of the UN, and second, what went wrong with multilaterally negotiated development cooperation. One contribution of multilateral institutions, in his view, is the current anti-protectionist sentiment and the prevailing favorable climate for market liberalization. There has been some improvement in the behavior of transnational corporations and some recognition for, and even implementation of special customized efforts for the least developed countries. He added that there has been some heightened appreciation of North-South interdependence, some improvements in living conditions, and quite a significant deceleration in population growth. Finally, he noted that over this period there have been a handful of countries that have moved closer to being "developed countries." Nevertheless, Brewster argued, no developing countries have actually become developed countries, in spite of fifty years of external financial aid and international community involvement in development efforts. Adding to the list of failures, Brewster pointed out that the majority of countries, especially in Africa , have witnessed stagnation and a substantial decline in overseas development assistance. Moreover, the commodity price and stability problem persists and in some cases has worsened. Terms of trade continue to deteriorate, and there is enormous inequality both within and between the North and the South. The technological gap between the North and the South continues to widen, economic integration in the South has failed, and the international community has gone from having some control over transnational corporations to what Brewster described as a situation of "benign neglect" by these corporations. Brewster was critical of what he argued is the North's general disregard of principles fully accepted in the North that should be applied in the South, principles such as democracy, social and economic security, anti-trust regulation, common public goods and economic human rights. Concluding that the balance sheet is "heavily in the red," Brewster then discussed what went wrong with the multilateral system. First, he argued that there were grave conceptual and analytical shortcomings in earlier approaches to development, as in the idea that growth equals development. He characterized those earlier approaches as being "highly econometric reductionism." A second shortcoming, he argued, was that the policies that came out of that reductionism and economistic approach were themselves highly mechanistic. They were "uni-optional" and rather authoritarian in the sense that they prescribed that programs be managed at the center through governments or the UN. As specific examples of this shortcoming, Brewster offered the Common Fund, codes of conduct for transnational corporations, codes for the transfer of technology, and targets of various kinds, including those of ODA. Third, Brewster argued that what went wrong with the multilateral system was that almost all of the policy thinking and formulation in the South was driven by intellectual elites. He acknowledged that this may have been necessary to counter the power and ideas of the North, but suggested that there have been certain consequences of that practice. He argued that not only were people not involved in the process, neither were governments, as the task of development thinking and of advancing particular ideas and policies was largely left to the intellectual leaders of international organizations. The result was that governments felt no sense of ownership over those ideas and policies, leaving the obligation of producing results to UN secretariats. A fourth shortcoming, Brewster observed, was that the UN failed to adapt to global political changes such as changes in the Soviet Union, the revival of freemarket capitalism and Reaganism, changes which deeply altered the dynamics of negotiating any global economic policies. The UN did not adjust its ideas and policies to take advantage of these emerging developments, but rather behaved as if nothing in the world had changed. A fifth factor that contributed to the difficulties of multilateralism is the "variable quality of leadership" in the UN. Referring to Berthelot's earlier comments about the need for courageous policies, Brewster argued that without quality leadership, it is not possible to have courage, conviction and integrity in multilateralism. Finally, Brewster observed that the UN's lack of real executive authority has also hampered its efforts to transform analysis, ideas and proposals into effective policy. He gave as an example of this, discussions on compensatory finance in which he himself participated. "I think our group did far more work, put in far more econometric resources and I think came up with far more interesting results which were the subject of a very demanding expert group, selected by governments themselves. After a long period of work and a series of meetings, agreement was reached on what would constitute a better system of compensatory financing. And that was the end of it. It was agreed and that was the end of it. It was never discussed further." With these possible changes in triumphant
capitalism in view, we will see some modulation in the role and in
the concept of government, and that will provide opportunities for
international governance. In assessing the future of multilateral efforts in development cooperation, Brewster concluded that the future will depend largely on how "triumphant capitalism" develops, what if any challengers to it emerge, and what dynamics for change are produced within capitalism itself. Jean Freymond Mr. Freymond began his remarks by saying that there are several angles through which to examine and evaluate the UN. First, its principles, which he said are the success story of the UN. Second, the ideas the UN has developed, in this case, its research. Freymond agreed with Berthelot's earlier assessment of UN research that the return on investment in research is too low, noting that there is more volume than quality, but unlike Berthelot, said that overall the UN had made sufficient contributions through its research so that "the pluses outweighed the minuses." Yet a third angle is UN activity in the field, its actions. This is where the major problems of the UN lie. Freymond argued that although there have been some successes in UN "action," for example, the eradication of smallpox and innovations in weather prediction, the UN still has not been as successful at the action level as it should or would like to be. He explained that the reason for this is the gap between ideas that emerge out of UN research and the UN's capacity to implement them. He suggested that this contradiction is what is "killing the UN." In the early 1990s we discussed the possibility
of working in depth on the economic reintegration of the Balkans as
a way to stabilize the area and bring back peace, an idea very much
in fashion today, We were prevented from moving forward due to the
position of one country in particular, Croatia. If we had been
able to act, we might have had avoided the further deepening of the
crisis. Freymond addressed the question of responsibility for these problems, asking whether the responsibility lies with the governments or with the UN secretariats. He concluded that it is a little of both. On the one hand, governments impose limits on secretariats, paricularly since the image of an international organization, he argued, is tied to that of its secretariat and not to its member states. An example of this is the WTO meetings in Seattle , where the target of protests was the WTO itself; its secretariat, not its member states. On the other hand, secretariats are not always effective. Freymond noted that often secretariats give little incentive for talented individuals to stay with the organization, and that much of the personnel at headquarters lacks first-hand field experience. Moreover, rivalries between agencies sabotage good ideas. These are some of the operational problems that must be addressed if the UN's inconsistencies are to be addressed effectively and its image changed from the prevailing one of ineffectiveness. Gamani Corea Dr. Gamani Corea began his reflection by addressing one of the questions posed by Hill "did we have a sufficiently deep understanding of the issues?" Corea said that although no one can claim to have had a perfect understanding of any issue, the thinking that emerged out of the UN system, particularly out of the early expert groups and then the team of UNCTAD I in 1964 led by Prebisch, reflects an appreciation of some of the main issues, especially those dealing with the external environment for development. What we have today is not globalization with
a human face, but polarization with a human face. Corea said that the UN system highlighted needs then that remain valid today, such as UNCTAD's early slogan of "trade and aid," the importance of the state in development, and UNCTAD's program of commodities. He explained that much of the UN's intellectual contribution on the idea of central planning in developing countries was not based on a commitment to socialist ideology but rather on the idea that the state, although weak in those countries, had to fill a vacuum. Corea pointed out that today, globalization does not ensure that developing countries will get the capital they need, as "private capital goes where profits are highest, not where policies are best." Moreover, it will not bring debt relief, and it will not stabilize commodity prices. So the state still has an important role to play. Corea explained that UNCTAD's Integrated Programme on Commodities (IPC) also did not have its origins in socialist thinking but rather in classical economics which said that there is no inherent corrective process in the market to stabilize commodity prices because of the leads and lags in supply responding to the high demand. Hence, the need for state action. Corea observed that according to a recent UNDP report, commodity prices today have reached their lowest level in the last 150 years, and although OPEC has once again tried to show its hand, the United States has made great efforts to keep oil prices down. Corea noted that similar efforts to stabilize other commodities are absent today, with calls in support of such efforts dismissed as "intervention." In light of this, the ideas behind the IPC still hold. In assessing the results of the UN, Corea saw the record as not entirely negative, but said the impact of its initiatives was severely influenced by global events, particularly the Cold War. He recounted the following anecdote to illustrate the impact of the Cold War on development assistance:
The post-Cold War period resulted in declining interest in development both within governments of the North as well as within the UN, and also resulted in the promotion of liberalization and globalization. Another global event that influenced UN initiatives was the OPEC oil shocks of the 1970s. In Corea's view, the oil shocks gave developing countries the feeling that as producers of commodities they had muscle if only they could organize. This, he said, is the reason why the commodities program featured so prominently in the UNCTAD agenda. Reflecting on the subject of the differentiation of developing countries, Corea remarked that there has always been differentiation and that too much has been made of this. For example, at UNCTAD I there was a lot of difference between Latin American countries and the least developed countries of Africa , but that did not stop the formation of the Group of 77. Although there is differentiation among countries in the South, he argued that as long as the Bretton Woods institutions prescribe the same remedy for all developing countries, the South should not undermine its own platform by emphasizing differentiation. In closing, Corea noted the need for what he called "a new development chapter"; a new piece of writing, a new statement of a Third World policy which takes into account all the new developments of globalization, liberalization, governance and so on, along with what remains valid from the earlier agenda developed out of UNCTAD I. He added that much of the earlier agenda of the G-77 was formulated in the post-war years by the secretariats of the UN system and not by the governments themselves, although these in turn adopted the thinking. Corea expressed little optimism that international institutions today can, or are being encouraged to play a similar leading intellectual role. Reinaldo Figueredo Mr. Reinaldo Figueredo echoed earlier participants' remarks that the greatest contribution of the UN are the principles that it has set, although he, too, acknowledged that failure to enforce these principles has been a shortcoming of the organization. He said that there is not enough attention paid to the gap between UN aspirations and global realities, and that as a result the UN is only deceiving itself, operating under an illusion that its efforts will be successful. When I was in my mid-twenties
in the 1960s, the UN was more than an illusion. It was a place
where we could see discussions of particular issues of interest, and
meet people from different countries raising these issues, people
that that later on became important officials in their countries.
So it was an opportunity to meet. Figueredo observed that the biggest problem the UN faces is its vertical approach to issues of development. While this vertical approach allows for greater depth into a particular issue, he argued it does not make the necessary connections across issue areas. Responding to Hill's earlier point about the need for a paradigm, Figueredo suggested that this problem would not be solved by developing a new paradigm. The solution, he argued, is to use elements, or "building blocks" already in existence. He offered an illustration from his own recent experience, a report he had recently completed for the High Commission for Human Rights. In this report, Figueredo and his colleagues make the linkage between debt relief and the Convention on the Worst Form of Child Labor; between development and the HIV/AIDS pandemic which he referred to as the "holocaust" of Africa and the greatest threat to African development; and between development and natural disasters such as hurricane Mitch in Central America and the flooding in Mozambique. These types of horizontal links across issues, he argued, represent a great step forward in the history of debt relief for poor countries. Figueredo was critical of the Bretton Wooods institutions for not sufficiently linking development issues to issues of human rights and poverty, and observed that UNCTAD itself does not integrate issues of human rights and poverty in its work program anymore. He then argued that the UN needed to shift its focus and move from advocacy work to action and that this needs collective leadership. Figueredo expressed concern that of the invited participants to this gathering who are part of this leadership, many did not attend the conference, and emphasized the need to discuss these issues with them. Finally, Figueredo suggested that this group and the United Nations Intellectual History Project encourage UN institutions themselves to identify salient issues and be self-critical. Louis Emmerij Mr. Louis Emmerij began by recounting his experience with the ILO's World Employment Program in the 1970s. He explained that the ILO set up the World Employment Program because it discovered that there were high rates of economic growth and yet not enough income earning opportunities. Emmerij then recounted how he recruited Dharam Ghai under whose leadership the basic needs strategy was elaborated, and with whom he wrote the Blue Book, the basis for the World Employment Conference. They succeeded in setting up what Emmerij called "a good balance" between economic efficiency and employment creation, and "a good balance" between economic growth and income distribution. It highlighted the positive and negative influences of multinational corporations, and the positive and negative aspects of socialism in eastern and central Europe . In spite of this balanced document, they encountered enormous opposition from all three representative groups of the ILO, governments, trade unions and employers, leading to the eventual withdrawal of the United States from the organization. I agree that we can
have globalization with a more civilized set of economic and financial
policies to redistribute the income engendered by this new engine
of economic growth. Turning to a discussion of the present, Emmerij expressed surprise about what he perceived as the ineffectiveness of the current financial and economic orthodoxy, "triumphant capitalism," and the lack of organized political and intellectual resistance to its negative effects, particularly from within the UN. He argued that the current orthodoxy has benefitted only a small minority of people in the world. Moreover, it is "slithering" into what he called “the new social question”; it has failed to solve employment, income distribution and poverty problems, while developing new social problems such as drug, economic migration and urban problems. Emmerij cautioned against equating globalization with the new economy, suggesting that a distinction be made between globalization, which in his view is a permanent phenomenon and potentially an engine for growth and development, and the current orthodoxy. He added that this is an area in which the UN could take the lead, noting that the Bretton Woods institutions have, with their adoption of the basic needs approach, been known to follow policies emanating from UN agencies. The difficulty he saw in successfully challenging this new orthodoxy is the "brainwashing" of new generations of students into the belief that all will be solved by triumphant capitalism. "We are back to trickle-down theories." Reflecting on the future role of the UN, Emmerij said that the organization has a role to play in being a "civilizing influence" over triumphant capitalism. When domestic capitalism became rampant one hundred years ago, it took someone like Bismarck, "hardly a radical statesman," to start thinking about mitigating the negative effects of capitalism through social security and the welfare state. Just when the world needs the UN to mitigate the negative impact of global transnational enterprises, the organization is under bitter attack. Branislav Gosovic Mr. Branislav Gosovic expressed the view that the biggest blow to the UN occurred with the end of the Cold War. The disappearance of the two competing powers and the unipolarity of the international system fundamentally changed the nature of the United Nations. The end result has been that the UN is gradually becoming more like the World Bank and the IMF. In other words, an organization totally controlled by the North, from personnel, budget, activities and the nature of its studies, to what staff is allowed to say in public. Gosovic said that this "global intellectual hegemony" has mechanisms of control at the global level not unlike those found in Stalinist Yugoslavia in the 1940s. In addition to the more overt pressures exerted on the organization through its budgets, research programs and various government debates, Gosovic asserted that there are also more covert mechanisms of coercion. UN staff respond to this overwhelming power to save their jobs or get promotions. This, he argued, has severely affected the character of the international civil service, as it has weeded out independent thinkers who have courage and integrity. The international civil servant today is preoccupied with "nonsense," by which Gosovic means bureaucratic squabbles and concerns about promotions. "When you are spending 95 percent of your intellectual energy, perhaps 100 percent of your emotional energy, on these totally marginal things, the organization loses its purpose." Another way this intellectual hegemony has affected the international civil service is by ending or limiting debates by the labeling of its proponents, either directly or through the media. He said that for example, if he were to raise old issues in the North-South debate that he considers still valid today, he would undoubtedly be labeled "a NIEO guy" and that would end the discussion there. No one would look at the merits of the proposal. I came here to Geneva in 1967 as a student
to study UNCTAD. On the second day I was walking around the Old City
and saw Prebisch looking in a window, all alone in a street which
was completely empty on that cold day. I said, “Mr. Prebisch, hello,
I’m Branislav Gosovic, and I’ve come here to study the organization.”
So we started chatting. Then I asked, “How do you reconcile
your role as a Secretary General of a UN organization with the help
you give to certain countries to get development aid by assisting
them in their arguments? I learned in school that international organizations
have to be neutral.” He looked at me and said: “Son, if you
walk down the street and you see a child being beaten by an old man,
would you just stand by and look?" As a result of this, Gosovic contended, the UN has been intellectually disarmed and neutralized. The organization is so threatened that it feels it must remain neutral in order to survive. The problem with this so-called neutrality is that the UN is really not neutral, as its inaction favors the predominant power in international relations. Also, whereas in the past the UN would question the dominant paradigm, today it not only does not challenge the new orthodoxy but actively promotes it. Gosovic noted that the consequences of this for the South are immense, as the only place developing countries learned about global issues was at the UN. It was the international organization's UNCTAD, ECLAC and others that showed countries in the South what united them. Today, the South is not united, witness for example, their scattered positions in the WTO, largely because the UN no longer acts to facilitate this type of discussion among developing countries. What developing countries need today, Gosovic concluded, is to become intellectually equipped, a task which requires an institution which will help tease out the common denominators among them. Only this way will they be able to resist the tremendous pressure they face today from one source of power. Enrique Ter Horst Mr. Enrique Ter Horst began his remarks by agreeing with earlier comments that the Third World has lost political leverage since the end of the Cold War, but said that it has also gained the freedom to have its arguments listened to more objectively. Referring to Corea's earlier comments about Americans liking success stories, Ter Horst added that they also like well-made arguments, hence the importance of continuing to make them. He argued that thus there is still a need to publish reports such as the Trade and Development and Human Development Reports, but that publishing them only is not enough; there has to be intergovernmental follow-up to the arguments made in the reports. The UN's remaining comparative advantage over Bretton Woods is its universality which potentially enables the UN to bring out more clearly and more forcefully the relationship between economic development, peace and security, and human rights. The lack of lucidity
and courage of the UN mentioned earlier is compounded by the inertia
and rigidity of the animal itself. Here the incremental approach
of the Anglo-Saxon countries seems to be much more prevalent than
the reformist approach of those of us of Latin culture. In Ter Horst's view, change today is coming from the North rather than from the South or from within the UN, citing recent examples of Bretton Woods reform, human rights activism and humanitarian interventions. He thought it indicative of this shift of venue of intellectual debates that the recent debate on IMF reform was being promoted by the US congress. Noting that "the revolution has been taken to the king's court," he pointed out that challenges to the current orthodoxy that once came out of the UN now are coming out of the World Bank and IMF by individuals like the Bank's former chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz. The UN today is plagued by inertia and rigidity and as a result has abdicated responsibility for many of the current debates to other institutions. Ter Horst introduced the issue of UN peacekeeping and noted that it is in dire need of reform as the Security Council continues to apply the same rules it applied 40 years ago in spite of changes in the nature of contemporary conflict. He argued that UNDP and the World Bank should be involved in any discussions of reform, particularly to address key issues of the root causes of conflict, yet he said that the two organizations continue to be excluded from discussions about the shape, length, and costs of an operation. This, he argued, is yet another example of the rigidity and inertia of the UN, the result, he suggested, of an insular environment which confirms and elects its leadership from within the organization rather than freshening the pool from outside. Ter Horst did note two reasons for optimism. The first is Secretary General Annan's novel approach of developing a consituency among the public and appealing to international public opinion as a means to put pressure on member governments to live up to some of their commitments. The second reason for optimism is US Ambassador Holbrooke's recent "opening" of the Security Council by holding sessions on AIDS in Africa and inviting Vice President Al Gore to speak on the environment. 4. Themes of general discussion Throughout its two-day discussions, the group identified some of the shortcomings of earlier approaches to international development cooperation and offered insights into which of the UN's contributions are of enduring value. Participants stopped short of offering concrete proposals for a new chapter in development. The following are the broad themes that emerged during the general discussion that followed the opening remarks. Contributions and shortcomings of the UN At the conclusion of the first session, Sheila O'Byrne remarked that thus far, the international organization had been described as an "animal," a "boat" and a "dinosaur" which was "overfed," "poisoned," and "losing its appeal." In spite of these references, participants did not view the UN's record as completely negative. Some noted that there has been some recognizable progress in development as measured by the human development index, although they acknowledged that it was not enough. Examples given of this progress included the alleviation of poverty and improvements in standards of living. Most participants were of the view that one of the UN's most important contributions has been the principles that it has put forth. In addition to being a standard-setter, the UN was the first institution to raise many of the major issues in economic and social development that later became widely accepted, such as the ideas of basic needs and full employment, and the link between poverty eradication and development. The contributions of UNCTAD's Group System were reiterated: it promoted transparency of negotiations largely by encouraging universal participation, imposed discipline in negotiations, facilitated decisions by consensus, helped developing countries "learn," and offered them a protective shield against major power pressure for votes. There was some debate about the value of research produced by the UN and the necessity for more of it. Some said that UN research has been valuable, noting for example the unprecedented and ground-breaking research of the ILO in the 1970s. Others suggested that in today's funding climate it is nearly impossible to expect independent UN research, reducing its value. The shortcomings of the UN were generally perceived to be the result of three principal factors: funding constraints imposed by major powers, the leadership within UN secretariats, and the rivalry between the UN and Bretton Woods institutions. Most agreed that the comparative advantage of the UN was its comprehensive approach to issues, but several participants noted that funding constraints have undermined that approach. Programs have been carved up and linked to funding sources, compartmentalizing instead the work of the organization. A consequence of this has been that UN secretariats are more concerned with maximizing the gains for their agencies than achieving some comprehensive development objective. Another major shortcoming of the UN linked to funding limitations is its failure to implement many of its ideas and principles. Several participants said that there is an enormous gap between UN ideas and aspirations and its capacity to enforce them. The reason for this gap, they argued, was because the major powers decide, through funding, what will be implemented. Many of the shortcomings of the organization was also blamed on its leadership, some even going so far as to suggest that the UN's problems are not financial but poor management. First, the development discourse at the UN has been non-participatory, led by secretariat elites who have not sufficiently included national governments and peoples in that discourse. The consequences of this, some argued, is that national governments, feeling no ownership over the ideas, have had little incentive to make them work, putting the onus for results instead on the UN itself. Second, some participants noted that because managers at the UN have little spending authority, and because it is difficult to fire individuals who fail to perform, managers have little accountability. Third, some remarked that there is little quality leadership with courage within the UN, and the organization has failed to produce incentives to keep or recruit qualified leaders. Finally, the institutional rivalries between the UN and Bretton Woods were seen by some to have had debilitating effects on the UN's efforts to formulate and successfully implement economic development policies. In an effort to capture the many thoughts participants had about what went wrong or right with the UN and why, Hill asked all participants for three words that they felt best expressed their observations of the UN. The words are noted in the following table: Table 1: Three words chosen by each participant that best express their reflections about the UN
NGOs and civil society In response to Lesley Sherwood's comment that in her experience, international NGOs are disillusioned with the UN, the group addressed the issue of the relationship between the UN and international NGOs. Several participants argued that the UN-NGO partnership is important first, because NGOs provide valuable research, and second, because the UN can play a key role in building NGO capacity to act, thus helping them to move beyond their advocacy function. Others cautioned that such public-private partnerships must be clearly defined either as partnerships of advocacy or partnerships of action, and be time-limited in order to measure objectives and results. There was some debate about how involved the UN should be with civil society, with some questioning to whom civil society is accountable. Others argued that civil society should be brought into the dialog and that civil society be more broadly defined to include "traditional" civil society groups that have not had a seat at the table, for example the local Imams and Buddhist monks. The Group of 77 A recurring theme of the group's discussions was the call for solidarity among developing countries. Many said that the old argument of strength through unity remained valid today, advocating that the South remain united or risk maintaining its weak negotiating position. Yet others observed that many of the needs of the South, such as deteriorating terms of trade and commodity price stabilization remain the same. Participants cited the need for a new agenda, a new statement of purpose of the South which would adjust and integrate old but still valid principles with the new political realities. This would not only enable the South to contribute to development discourse, but also help establish a history of the G-77. Several participants characterized the South-South Summit in Havana in April 2000 as a lost opportunity, the consequence of not having a narrative to draw on. Some in the group suggested that developing countries need to find new mechanisms to develop the analytical capability to contribute to multilateral fora because UN secretariats are no longer providing the intellectual underpinnings that they did in the past. This intellectual capacity is important, they argued, since without it developing countries can only be reactive to others' proposals. Other participants expressed skepticism, noting that this argument has been made before with little result. Finally, there was a discussion about what some participants characterized as the failure of the South Centre to successfully perform the role of secretariat of the South. Globalization Another recurring theme of the group's discussions regarded the existence of globalization and its benefits. Some questioned the very existence of the phenomenon, arguing that "globalization is not a fact," although others pointed out that there is ample evidence to suggest that finance, communication, travel and technologies are truly global. Some said that the world is seeing increased regionalization, not globalization. Others argued that globalization and regionalization are competing trends in the world that will influence future development debates. Yet others in the group argued that globalization is "one world with two lifestyles," arguing that today's system is being misrepresented as a model of market efficiency whereas the reality is that one actor alone can influence the entire system. Future challenges of the UN There was general agreement among participants that the international system, as it is evolving, is not meeting the needs of many. Some noted that the UN today is challenged by a struggle between two of its principles: the principle of sovereignty versus the normative principle of creating a better world. They argued that this is a challenge for the organization because its ideological framework is being used to erode its institutional framework. Another challenge mentioned was the lack of media coverage and public education of the UN, resulting in little real public debate on UN issues. Some observed that the UN has been increasingly marginalized since the end of the Cold War, while others pointed out that, as the increased responsibilities assumed by the ECE since 1990 demonstrate, the end of the Cold War has presented the UN with golden opportunities. Some suggestions for seizing such opportunities were first, for the UN to use multinational corporations to promote development objectives by encouraging them to mentor local entrepreneurs. Second, the UN could give incentives to the new economic elites that are emerging out of the information technology industries and to the growing philanthropic community to invest in development projects by instituting a grading system for development projects similar to those for foreign investment. Finally, developing countries could press for free trade in return for providing migrant labor services to industrialized countries, or expand "return-of-residence" programs to encourage expatriates to contribute to development efforts. Finally, there was a call for wider participation in development debates, and for the UN to adjust to the new political, economic and technological realities. 5. Next steps The group discussed possible outcomes of the conference and agreed on the following: First, a revised list of participants with their current contact information would be distributed to those attending the meeting with the goal to facilitate and encourage on-going contact among the group. Second, the United Nations Intellectual History Project would produce a synthesis report of the proceedings which would be distributed to all invited participants. Hill undertook to write a short executive summary which would be available shortly after the conclusion of the conference. The group also agreed that their reflections could be used by the United Nations Intellectual History Project as a contribution to its oral history component, and that the tapes of the discussions would become part of the Project's archives, with copies sent to Hill. Finally, there was general agreement that this had been a useful analytical retrospective that should be followed-up in some way, although most participants argued against institutionalizing the group. Hill offered to distribute his thoughts about possible follow-up activities, including possibly developing a web page, and solicit suggestions. APPENDIX A - LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
When the "roll" was called, we spent a moment
in silence to remember those of our companions who had passed on and
those who were not able to be with us, but who we felt present in
spirit. Over the two days we had, as anticipated, great fun. There
were deep insights, anecdotes, many questions and even some conclusive
answers. Among the questions posed were, what remains to be done?
Should we give up on our past efforts? And should we meet again? For
the last question we agreed that our meeting was fruitful, that our
conversation merited yet another gathering at which time hopefully,
those absent would be present. By the time the Conversation turned to the
fourth question, namely "why?" (Why were there less than optimum outcomes?
Why was there one outcome instead of another?). We had reached the
point where we were thinking of "next steps", a "new agenda", a "reaffirmation
of the UN system", "partnerships with the civil society", "alliances
with the private sector", a "new development chapter", a re-look at
what we had achieved and even a consideration of "the third way",
which is the subject of a series of discussions led by the United
States and Britain. Anthony
Hill |